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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
LEO BARRETT STEW ART, JR., 
Defenda.n.t and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9331 
BRIEF OF RESP·O·NDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Reference in respondent's brief to the record of pro-
ceedings of the trial court will be designated by the letter 
"R" and to appellant's brief by the letter "B." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent finds itself in substantial agreement with 
the facts as set forth in the Brief of Appellant, and hence 
does not submit a separate statement of facts in con-
nection with its brief. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EX-
CLUDING TESTIMONY RELATING TO 
PRIOR ACCIDENTS. 
PoiNT II. 
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN 
EXCLUDING TESTIMONY RELATING TO 
PRIOR ACCIDENTS, SUCH ERROR WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
PoiNT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE, AND EVEN IF 
SUCH ERROR WAS COMMITTED, IT WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EX-
CLUDING TESTIJ\IONY RELATING TO 
PRIOR ACCIDENTS. 
The general rule of lR\V regarding the admissibility of 
evidence of prior accidents is rorrecti~~ set forth by ap-
pellant. (B. 32) 
"It is recognized in numerous cases that for cer-
tain purposes, at least, evidence of other similar 
accidents or injuries at or near the same place or 
by use of the same appliance suffered by persons 
other than the plaintiff and in other and different 
times, not too remote in point of time from the 
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particular occurrence, is admissible. Evidence of 
prior similar accidents, when admissible, is gen-
erally admissible for the following purposes only: 
(1) To show the existence of a defective or dan-
gerous condition or appliance and the dangerous 
character of the place of injury or of the machine 
or the appliance, and (2) to show the defendant's 
notice or knowledge thereof." 
20 Am. J ur ., Evidence, 304, p. 282. 
The rule generally is applicable, however, only in 
those cases wherein there is substantial similarity be-
tween the circumstances surrounding the prior accident 
and the one before the Court. 
''The pertinence of such evidence is, of course, 
drawn from the facts that the various accidents 
occurred at the same place and under conditions 
which were at least substantially similar, and the 
courts have frequently emphasized the necessity 
of showing such similarity of conditions as a 
predicate for the admission of the evidence. How-
ever, it has usually been held that only substantial 
similarity of conditions is required, and there is 
perhaps evident a trend - probably part of a 
general trend toward the more liberal admission 
of evidence - toward treating the question of 
sufficiency of similarity of conditions as primarily 
a matter for the trial court's discretion, and to 
freely admit the evidence of the prior accident to-
gether with evidence of variations in conditions, 
which is treated as going to weight rather than 
admissibility.'' 
Anno. : 70 ALR 2d 170, 171. (See cases cited 
therein.) The annotation goes on to say that this type 
of evidence is sometimes excluded on the grounds that 
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it is inconvenient for the court to investigate prior acci-
dents to determine their relevancy; and further, that 
whether this evidence shall be admitted is best deter-
mined by the court in its discretion. 
'• The strongest attack of evidence of the type here 
considered has been based upon grounds of trial 
convenience rather than upon its lack of relevance. 
Especially in the earlier cases, the courts have 
expressed the fear that if the evidence were re-
ceived the trial would be disrupted by the neces-
sity of investigating all the circumstances of the 
various incidents in question, and have concluded 
that the simplest and most desirable solution was 
to exclude all such evidence. However, in the more 
recent decisions in most jurisdictions there is ap-
parent a tendency to treat this question ad hoc, 
leaving it to the trial judge in each case to deter-
mine whether the evidence should be excluded on 
this ground and, if the evidence is admitted, to de-
termine the extent to which the circumstances of 
the earlier accident can be investigated." (p. 172) 
Appellant cites several Utah cases wherein the gen-
eral rule regarding admission of evidence of prior acci-
dents has been substantially adopted. It should be noted 
that in all of these cases the circumstances involving the 
prior accidents were substantially similar to the ones be-
fore the court. The Bamberger case, Parker v. Bamber-
ger, et al., 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425, dealt with an 
allegedly defective wig-wag signal. Evidence that this 
same signal had failed to function on previous occasions 
was held to be properly admitted. In the Stocker case, 
Stocker v. Ogden City, McFarland v. Ogden City, 88 Utah 
389, 54 P. 2d 849, it was alleged that water from a cer-
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tain stream was contaminated. The Court admitted evi-
dence showing that others had drunk from the same 
stream with no apparent ill effects. The Shugren case, 
Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320, 159 Pac. 530, was 
concerned with an allegedly defective sidewalk. Evidence 
was admitted that others had tripped on that same piece 
of sidewalk. 
In each of these cases the relevancy of the evidence 
admitted to the question before the court is apparent. In 
one case the same wig-wag signal is involved; in another 
the same stream and source of water ; and in the third 
the same defective piece of sidewalk. 
But as regards the instant case, this requirement of 
similarity of conditions is not met. The appellant's 
proffer of proof (B. 20; R. 91) is to the effect that Mr. 
Challis, if allowed to testify, '' * * * would testify with 
reference to the number of accidents which occurred at 
the intersection in the year 1959, the total of 24 in all, 
to show their relationship to the present or to the case 
at bar and the similarities that existed between them.'' 
Also, Mr. Challis would have testified that the inter-
section in question had one of the highest accident ratios 
in Salt Lake City for the five years preceding 1959; that 
studies had been made of the dangerous condition of the 
intersection; and that, among other things, changes in 
the semaphore system were recommended because of the 
difficulty in detecting the color of the light when the 
rays of the sun were directly upon it. (See appellant's 
proffer of proof.) 
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Apparently, appellant wanted Mr. Challis to testify 
concerning the history of accidents at the intersection for 
a period of at least one year, and possibly as many as 
five. Appellant testified at the trial that he observed 
the semaphore some 150 feet from the intersection, and 
that it was green at the time. (R. 88) He further tes-
tified that the rays of the sun were bearing down into 
the signal as he approached it. (R. 86) Apparently it is 
appellant's contention that the sun may have been shin-
ing upon the signal in such a way as to prevent him 
from detecting that it had turned red against him. That 
being so, testimony as regards prior accidents occurring 
at this intersection involving the affect of the sun upon 
the semaphore would be admissible under the rules set 
forth above. But appellant's approach is that of a scat-
tergunner. In his proffer of proof he fails to show how 
any of the prior accidents were related to the problem of 
the sun shining into the signal. He urges that testimony 
based on studies of all accidents over a protracted 
period of time be admitted. 
It is conceivable, but not probable, that all the prior 
accidents involved this question of the effect of the rays 
of the sun. Perhaps some of them did. But in absence of 
a more definite showing to that effect in appellant's prof-
fer of proof, the trial court was justified in assuming 
that the testimony of Mr. Challis· would in the main be 
irrelevant and it was therefore properly excluded. 
"Where excluded evidence is not material unless 
other proof is made, and no evidence is received 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or offered to establish that proof, such exclusion 
will not justify a reversal.'' 
5A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 1080. 
The Court's ruling on the proffer of proof is not a 
part of the record. However, the Judge's statement re-
garding the admissibility of the Challis testimony (R. 
81-83) indicate that he was not satisfied that the prior 
accidents met the test of substantial similarity. He was 
also concerned about the inconvenience involved in ana-
lyzing many prior accidents to determine their relevancy. 
This latter reason is in accord with the holding of at least 
some courts, particularly as regards cases dealing with 
dangerous condition as opposed to notice. These cases 
are collected in annotation at 70 ALR 2d 170, 192. 
That portion of the record dealing with the refusal 
to admit the Challis testimony is printed below: (Italics 
supplied) 
''THE CouRT : I'm not sure I am going to let Mr. 
Challis testify to that effect, Mr. McCullough, be-
cause I have ruled heretofore that that is imma-
terial. Whether a lot of other people have been 
negligent or whether a lot of other people have 
run stop signs is no concern of ours. Whether this 
defendant was negligent is a concern of ours ; if 
he is negligent, whether it is of such a grave na-
ture as to constitute recklessness so as to bring him 
within this charge; and I don't believe that this 
jury or I would be interested in knowing that on 
other occasions other people have done the same 
thing. I think I would not take our time on that. 
l\1R. McCuLLOUGH : Well, I think the testimony 
that he can give with reference to this intersection 
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and subsequent changes that have taken place are 
rna terial and go to the very issue that we are try-
ing to decide, this question of recklessness. 
THE CouRT : Well, I'm not going to let him tell 
about how many people have violated the law or 
whether or not they have violated the law. I don't 
think that helps us a bit. If there is anything pe-
culiar about this intersection or its timing that 
would help the jury in determining whether this 
defendant violated the law, then, of course, it 
would be material; but just for us to get out and 
try to determine whether other people were vio-
lating the law· or not won't help us here. It seems 
to me it is something like when a man is charged 
with negligently shooting a deer hunter, and he 
could show every year so many deer hunters get 
shot every year. We are not interested in that 
case. We are interested in what happened in this 
case, and I will limit you to this case. 
MR. McCULLOUGH : Of course, I don't want to dis-
pute the rna tter with Your Honor since you have 
the last word any way. 
THE CouRT : Well, I do temporarily. 
MR. McCuLLouGH: But if you are going to limit 
it to that extent, the only issue is if the light was 
red, the light was red when he ran it, then he is 
guilty period. 
"THE CouRT: No, that is not quite. My instruc-
tions will show that is not true. There has got to 
be an element of recklessness in here before this 
defendant is guilty. 
MR. McCuLLOUGH: Well, we will proceed then, 
Your Honor. If that is going to be Your Honor's 
ruling-
THE CouRT: Yes. 
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MR. McCuLLOUGH : -of course, we would like-
THE CouRT: I am going to rule that this jury has 
no interest in whether other people have run 
lights because if we get that before us, we have 
got to go into every case to find out whether some-
body else was negligent, and that is not - well, 
it seems to me we would be here a month, arnd I 
had better stop it before we get started." 
PoiNT II. 
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN 
EXCLUDING TESTIMONY RELATING TO 
PRIOR ACCIDENTS, SUCH ERROR WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Section 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides that the com-
mission of error by the trial court will not be presumed 
to have resulted in prejudice, and that a cause will not be 
reversed for error unless that error affects the substan-
tial rights of the party. See also State v. Neal (1953), 
262 P. 2d 756, and State v. Justesen, 99 Pac. 456. 
The evidence against appellant that was admitted 
at trial was of such weight that the admission of the 
testimony of Mr. Challis relating to prior accidents 
would not have had any appreciable effect on the jury's 
determination. 
'' * * * the error is considered as harmless where 
the evidence, if admitted, could not have affected 
the result.'' 
5A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, 1069. 
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Three persons who were eyewitnesses to the acci-
dent involving the appellant were called upon to testify 
by the prosecution. Earl B. Taylor testified (R. 52-59) 
that he was traveling south on 9th East. At the inter-
section of 9th East and 21st South he testified that he 
stopped for a red light and that his auto was directly 
behind that of the deceased, Mr. Weddington, who also 
stopped for the light. He further testified that the light 
turned green and the Weddington auto proceeded into 
the intersection, and that it was struck broadside by a 
pickup truck that was traveling west on 21st South by 
the appellant. The appellant, according to Mr. Taylor, 
did not stop before proceeding into the intersection. 
Another eyewitness, Mrs. Joanne Monroe, testified 
(R. 62-68) that she was traveling west on 21st South 
in the right-hand lane of traffic. She was traveling be-
hind another car. The car ahead of hers stopped at the 
intersection, and she did likewise. She testified that the 
light was red, and ''I didn't notice that I had any difficul-
ty in seeing the light." She further testified: (R. 63) 
''A. I had been stopped, oh, approximately three 
or four seconds when I noticed - there was one 
car in the lane next to me, and I noticed another 
car approaching, but he did not seem to be slow-
ing down to stop for the red light. 
Q. Okeh. Now, you say he was in the lane to your 
left? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right, and what happened? 
10 
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A. Well, my first idea was that he was going to 
run the red light, and as he continued on into the 
intersection, I noticed another car approaching 
from the north, and then I thought there was 
going to be an accident. 
Q. And what - will you tell me, did you see the 
accident happen f 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what happened f 
A. The car that had passed me on the left hit the 
car that was going south through the inter-
section.'' 
The third eyewitness, Douglas Hubbard (R. 68-78), 
testified that he was traveling north on 9th East and that 
he stopped for a red light at the intersection of 21st 
South. The light turned green in his favor and he pro-
ceeded into the intersection but stopped when he saw the 
approaching truck driven by appellant. (R. 69) 
Mr. Hubbard further testified: (R. 61) 
''A. After the light turned green - I am in the 
habit of looking at traffic. I don't trust the light, 
and as I looked to my right, I saw this truck, 
pick-up truck, and he seemed to be coming along 
at a fairly good speed, and I didn't think he was 
going to stop, and I had crossed the lane about 
three feet approximately, so I stopped, and the 
truck went in front of me. 
Q. And did you see what happened to the truck f 
"A. Yes. The truck hit I believe it was a gray 
Plymouth. It hit it approximately in the center. 
It took just about the front door and back of the 
front door, approximately the center of the car.'' 
11 
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'' Q. All right. Can you tell me what, if anything, 
you noticed about the speed of this truck from that 
point on~ 
A. I would say he was traveling close to twenty-
five miles an hour, and as he approached the cross 
lane, he stepped on it, and I would say at the point 
of impact he was traveling about thirty. He had 
increased his speed I would say about five miles an 
hour. 
Q. Will you tell me what makes you think that he 
increased his speed~ 
A. Well, just normal observation, and I could 
hear the sound. It wasn't too new a truck, and 
you could hear the roar of it as he stepped on it, 
and you could see the actual movement that it was 
moving faster.'' 
In synthesis, the testimony of these witnesses was 
that there were, in addition to the Weddington car and 
the truck of appellant, four other automobiles at or near 
the scene of the accident. Two of these, the Monroe car 
and another, were traveling west on 21st South, the same 
as the appellant. The appellant was traveling in the in-
side lane, the Monroe car and another in the right-hand 
lane. Both the Monroe car and the one directly in front 
of it stopped for the red light. Apparently the drivers of 
both cars were able to see the red light, and indeed, Mrs. 
Monroe testified she had no difficulty in seeing it. Yet, 
even though these cars were stopped in the lane next to 
the appellant and presumably could be seen by him, he 
did not stop. The two witnesses who were traveling on 
9th East, one going south, the other north, testified that 
the light was green for traffic proceeding on 9th East 
12 
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at the time Mr. Weddington proceeded into the inter-
section. This, together with the testimony of Mrs. Mon-
roe, strongly establishes that the light was red when the 
appellant proceeded through it. Sufficient evidence was 
presented that the light was against the appellant, and 
that others traveling in the same direction saw the red 
light and were stopped at the intersection at the time 
appellant proceeded through. Appellant was also ob-
served to have increased his speed as he neared the 
intersection. 
The jury weighed the evidence and determined that 
appellant "did unlawfully and negligently drive said ve-
hicle with reckless disregard for the safety of others.'' 
(R. 8) Had this evidence relative to prior accidents been 
admitted it would not, in light of the weight of other evi-
dence admitted, operated to have changed the verdict re-
turned by the jury. It is therefore urged that the exclu-
sion of the prior accident evidence, even if error, was 
uot prejudicial. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE 
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE, AND EVEN IF 
SUCH ERROR WAS COMMITTED, IT WAS 
NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Appellant's Point II(A) (B. 34) deals with admission 
of testimony by Officer Johnson wherein the officer states 
that appellant made certain statements to him at the 
scene of the accident. (R. 39) It is not clear whether 
appellant contends that this testimony was inadmis~ible, 
or that the error, if any, consisted in the court's refusal 
13 
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to allow cross-examination by appellant. In either case, 
the testimony involves whether appellant did or did not 
run the red light, and whether he did or did not admit 
same. As there is sufficient testimony of other parties, 
which is uncontroverted, that appellant did run the red 
light, there seems little reason to pursue this issue. If 
error was in fact committed in this regard, it could not 
have been prejudicial. 
As to appellant's Point II (B) (B. 35), respondent's 
position in regard to the testimony of Officer Johnson 
concerning the danger of the intersection is substantially 
the same as that set forth in Point I of respondent's brief. 
The fact that this intersection may have been dangerous 
is not relevant, absent some showing of substantial re--
lationship between the case at bar and the dangers con-
nected with the intersection. 
Appellant's Point II(C) (B. 35) also deals with tes-
timony concerning prior accidents. The same reasoning 
applies here as in the other situations involving testi-
mony of prior accidents. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the conviction of the lower 
court should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
ROLAND G. ROBISON, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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